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Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc.: Chicago
Cubs Ticket Scalping Scandal and the Relationship
Between Separate Corporate Entities Owned by a
Common Parent
I. INTRODUCTION
An important decision was recently handed down that could have
transformed the loveable image of the Chicago Cubs ("the Cubs")
into woefully dishonest ticket scammers.1 In the class-action lawsuit
Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. ,2 the Chicago Tribune-
owned Cubs allegedly scalped its own tickets in violation of Illinois
law.3
The popular debate, which stemmed from the admiration the Cubs
engender from its loyal fans, became entangled with the substantive
law. The lawsuit contended that Wrigley Field Premium Tickets, Inc.
("Premium"), a sister company to the Cubs, was established so that
the Cubs could withhold tickets from games. Consumers are com-
pelled to buy tickets from its affiliated brokerage at prices above those
printed on the ticket. 4 Not surprising, many considered the Cubs to
be scalping its own tickets in violation of the Illinois Ticket Scalping
Act. Following the Cubs successful defense, echoes of former Chicago
Cubs announcer Harry Caray could be heard emanating from the
courtroom: Cubs Win!!! Cubs Win!!!
This Note will discuss whether Premium was merely an extension of
the Cubs, or an entirely separate subsidiary corporation. This distinc-
tion is crucial when considering whether the Cubs and Premium vio-
lated Illinois law and deceived consumers. Part II will discuss the
background and legal history of ticket scalping leading up to Cavoto v.
Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. Additionally, this section
will address the relevant statutes and case law courts consider when
asked to disregard the corporate separateness of affiliated corpora-
tions. The factors courts take into account when considering claims of
consumer fraud, unfair competition and the likely confusion as to the
1. Lester Munson, Scalp Treatment?: The Cubs are Ticking Off Fans by "Brokering" Tickets
for Far Above Face Value, Sports Illustrated, June 23, 2003, at 22.
2. Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., No. 02 CH 18372 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 24,
2003).
3. Sara D. White, For the Record, Crain's Chicago Business, August 18, 2003, at 42.
4. David Eggert, Cubs Exec Defends Club's Ticket Brokerage Operation, Medill News Service,
at http://xavier.cs.northwestern.edu:8000/article.asp?articlelD=8137&item=2 (Aug. 13, 2003).
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source of sponsorship will also be discussed. Part III will explain the
underlying facts in Cavoto and the Circuit Court's decision. Part IV
will critique the Circuit Court's decision in Cavoto. Part V will specu-
late how Cavoto will affect consumers and how other event promoters
will alter ticket sales strategies at their venues.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the current state of ticket scalping in Illinois,
a brief history of ticket scalping will be discussed. This section will
also attempt to clarify the concept of disregarding the corporate form
and explain the factors courts examine when determining if corpora-
tions are truly separate, co-existing legal entities. How a private indi-
vidual can establish a cause of action under the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act will also be discussed.
Furthermore, an explanation of how courts determine whether a prac-
tice is unfair will be discussed as well. Finally, this section will ex-
amine what a consumer must prove in order to maintain an action
under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
a. Ticket Scalping and Its Legal Evolution
Ticket scalping is defined as "the reselling of tickets to popular en-
tertainment or sporting events at whatever price the market will
bear."5 By direct or indirect methods, professional scalpers acquire
tickets from the box office and retain the tickets until other buyers
have exhausted the box office supply.6 Scalpers then offer to resell
their tickets at prices substantially higher than their original value.7
The event's popularity is the only ceiling for what scalpers charge.8
Scalpers damage the goodwill of event promoters. The sudden ex-
haustion of box office supply and the emergence of scalpers with nu-
merous tickets inevitably induce accusations of fraud and collusion
against the promoter.9 Thus, promoters detest ticket scalpers.
Nevertheless, while the public and promoters have consistently re-
garded ticket scalping with antipathy, the opinion of the courts has
changed over time. In Illinois, the judicial response to legislative at-
tempts at regulating ticket scalping has varied. In 1907, Illinois
adopted a law that "prohibited the sale of tickets for more than the
5. Thomas A. Diamond, Ticket Scalping: A New Look at An Old Problem, 37 U. Miami L.
Rev. 71 (1982).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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price printed thereon, for theaters, circuses and places of amuse-
ment,"'10 and prohibited the establishment of an agency for such a
sale." However, in People v. Steele, the Illinois Supreme Court de-
clared the act to be an unconstitutional violation of the due process
clause of the Illinois Constitution.12 The court reasoned that "[t]here
is nothing immoral in the sale of theater tickets at an advance over the
price of the box-office. Such sale is not injurious to the public welfare
and does not affect the public health, morals, safety, comfort or good
order. '1 3 The court further contended that the buyer was not com-
pelled, but purchased tickets voluntarily.1 4 Hence, the Illinois Su-
preme Court originally regarded ticket sale restrictions to be arbitrary
and unreasonable interferences with the rights of the individuals con-
cerned.'5 Thus, as the Illinois legislature's aversion to ticket scalping
became apparent, the Illinois Supreme Court did not originally be-
lieve that ticket scalping injured the buyer or the proprietor of a
theater.16
Thereafter, Chicago enacted an ordinance restricting theatre ticket
sales and the formation of collusive alliances. 17 The object of the ordi-
nance was to compel impartial treatment of all buyers of tickets by the
licensee. 18 However, the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. The
Cort Theater Co. v. Thompson changed its opinion of ticket scalping.
The court conceded that individuals were not technically forced to buy
tickets from scalpers, but had a choice between paying the higher
price and not attending the ticketed event.19 The Illinois Supreme
Court in Cort Theater reasoned that "[w]itnessing a theatrical per-
formance is not one of the necessaries of life, but that affords no rea-
son why the legislative power should not be exerted to prevent
misrepresentation and fraud in the sale of theater tickets by the thea-
10. People v. Steele, 83 N.E. 236 (Ili. 1907).
11. Id. at 238.
12. Id. at 240.
13. Id. at 238.
14. Id.
15. People v. Patton, 309 N.E.2d 572, 573 (Ill. 1974).
16. Steele, 231 N.E. at 238.
17. People ex rel The Cort Theater Company v. Thompson, 119 N.E. 41, 42 (Ill. 1918). The
Chicago ordinance stated:
[E]very ticket of admission to a theater shall have printed upon its face the price therof,
and that no licensee, and no officer, manager or employee of the licensee, shall directly
or indirectly receive any consideration... upon the sale of any such ticket beyond or in
excess of the price designated theron, or directly or indirectly enter into any arrange-
ment or agreement for the receipt of such consideration.
18. ld. at 43.
19. Id. at 45.
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ter owners and to require fair and impartial treatment of the public." 20
Thus, the court upheld the Chicago ordinance.
In Cort Theater, a theater owner entered into a collusive alliance
where perspective ticket buyers were told the show was sold out and
subsequently purchased tickets above face value from a scalper that
directed the theater to provide the ticket.21 The court believed that
the type of collusive alliances the Chicago ordinance was directed at
were those where the "theater owner entered into a secret agreement
with a ticket reseller in which they both shared in the profits gener-
ated by the reseller's sale of tickets above face value. '2 2 Thus, the
court realized what it refused to recognize in Steele; ticket scalping
injured consumers.
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court examined a New York
ticket scalping law in Tyson and Brother-United Theatre Ticket Of-
fices v. Banton.23 The New York statute forbade the resale of any
ticket to any theater "at a price in excess of fifty cents in advance of
the price printed on the face of such ticket... 24 In addition, the law
specifically declared the price of admission to theatres to be a matter
affected with a public interest and subject to state supervision in order
to safeguard the public against fraud, extortion, exorbitant rates and
similar abuses.25 However, the Court was not willing to defer to the
New York Legislature's conclusory assertion that ticket sales were a
matter affected with public interest. In rejecting New York's argu-
ment, the Court concluded that the power to fix prices existed only
where the business was "affected with a public interest. ' '26 In order for
a business to be affected with a public interest, it must be devoted to
"a public use."'27 Accordingly, the sales of theatre tickets bore no re-
lation to the commerce of the country; a place of entertainment is in
no legal sense a public utility and the regulation of a theatre's activi-
ties can not be justified as an emergency measure. 28 As a result, the
Court concluded that a theatre was a private enterprise. The Court
regarded theatres as historically falling outside the classes of activities
that should be controlled. 29 The Court further reasoned "[it [was]
20. Id.
21. Id. at 42.
22. Id.
23. Tyson and Brother-Untied Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 427 (1927).
24. Id.
25. Id..
26. Id.
27. Id. at 434.
28. Tyson and Brother, 273 U.S. at 439-40.
29. Id. at 441.
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not permissible to enact a law which, in effect, spreads an all-inclusive
net for the feet of everybody upon the chance that, while the innocent
will surely be entangled in its meshes, some wrong-doers also may be
caught. '' 30 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the New York stat-
ute was unconstitutionally over-inclusive.
By 1934, the United States Supreme Court developed a new test for
analyzing economic regulations. In Nebbia v. New York, the Court
held a New York price fixing statute to be constitutional. 31 The New
York legislature desired to remedy the evils in the milk industry by
attempting to prevent destructive price-cutting. 32 The Court specifi-
cally rejected the test enumerated in Tyson and Brother by stating
"the expressions 'affected with a public interest,' and 'clothed with a
public use,'. . . as the criteria of the validity of price control... are not
susceptible of definition and form an unsatisfactory test of constitu-
tionality... ,,33 The Court recognized that "[a]s far as due process is
concerned ... a State is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. ' 34 Thus, price control
laws are constitutional as long as "laws have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discrimina-
tory... -135 Using this new test, the Court upheld the New York milk
price fixing statute. 36 The Court concluded that the law was not un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or without relation to the purpose of the
legislation. 37
The Illinois legislature subsequently passed a price fixing statute
regulating the sale of tickets to various amusement events.38 The stat-
ute was amended in 1935 by adding section 1.5, which prohibited the
sale of amusement tickets at a price higher than the price printed
upon the face of the ticket. 39 However, this amendment was virtually
identical to the provision in Steele that the court held to be invalid.
30. Id. at 443.
31. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
32. Id. at 530.
33. Id. at 536.
34. Id. at 537.
35. Id.
36. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 530.
37. Id. at 530.
38. Patton, 57 I11. 2d at 45.
39. Id. at 46. The Act provided:
[i]t is unlawful for any person, persons, firm or corporation to sell tickets.. .for a price
more than the price printed upon the face of said ticket, and the price of said ticket
shall correspond with the same price shown at the box office or the office of original
distribution.
2004] 727
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Accordingly, the constitutionality of this statute was called in to ques-
tion in People v. Patton.40 In sustaining the statute, the Illinois Su-
preme Court applied the "reasonable relation test" enumerated in
Nebbia and rejected the application of the "affected with public inter-
est test."'41 The court reasoned that "contrary to the holding of this
court in Steele... it appears that the law is now settled that a State has
a legitimate interest in seeking to control the resale price of tickets to
places of entertainment and amusement. '42 In overruling Steele, the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the statute was reasonably re-
lated to its objective and did not violate the due process clause. 43
Consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Patton,
courts currently hold anti-scalping legislation not to be a violation of a
person's constitutional guarantee of free enterprise. 44 The court af-
firmatively recognized that regulating the resale price of sports and
entertainment admission tickets are a legitimate state interest.45
Subsequent to Patton, the Illinois legislature amended the Ticket
Scalping Act permitting a reasonable service charge in 1978.46 In Peo-
ple v. Waisvisz, the court upheld the amended statute. 47 The purpose
of the amendment was to prevent ticket scalpers from purchasing
large blocks of tickets for the best seats at sporting and entertainment
events and then reselling the tickets at exorbitant prices.4 The Illinois
Court of Appeals deferred to the legislature's opinion that the public
welfare would be furthered by having the tickets freely available for
sale at face value or at somewhat higher than face value from a ticket
distributor acting with the event sponsor's permission .49 The court
concluded that the statute was constitutional.50 The court reasoned
that "[t]he legislature could reasonably have concluded entities acting
with permission of event sponsors would not charge the exorbitant
40. Id. at 45.
41. Id. at 49.
42. Patton, 57 I11. 2d at 47.
43. Id.
44. Paul J. Criscuolo, Reassessing the Ticket Scalping Dispute: The Application, Effects and
Criticisms of Current Anti-Scalping Legislation, 5 Seton Hall J. Sports L. 189 (1995).
45. Id.
46. 1978 Ill. Laws 1245. The amendments provided:
Nothing contained in this Act was ever intended to prohibit nor shall ever be deemed
to prohibit a ticket seller, with the consent of the sponsor of such baseball game, foot-
ball game, hockey game, theatre entertainment or other amusement, from collecting a
reasonable service charge, in addition to the printed box office ticket price, form a
ticket purchaser in return for service actually rendered.
47. 582 N.E.2d 1383 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
48. Waisvisz, 582 N.E.2d at 1387.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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prices charged by the stereotypical 'ticket scalper,' and specifically
provided only a 'reasonable service charge' in addition to the printed
ticket price could be imposed."'51
After Waisvisz, the Illinois General Assembly affirmatively legal-
ized ticket brokering. Under section 1.5 of the Ticket Scalping Act,
ticket brokers are now permitted to sell tickets in excess of the printed
box office price by complying with the enumerated requirements. 52
51. Id.
52. 720 I11. Comp. Stat. 375/1.5(b). This Act does not apply to the sale of tickets of admission
to a sporting event, theater, musical performance, or place of public entertainment or amuse-
ment of any kind for a price in excess of the printed box office ticket price by a ticket broker
who meets all the following requirements:
(1) The ticket broker is duly registered with the Office of the Secretary of State on a
registration form provided by that Office. The registration must contain a certifica-
tion that the ticket broker:
(A) engages in the resale of tickets on a regular and ongoing basis from one or
more permanent or fixed locations located within this State;
(B) maintains as the principal business activity at those locations the resale of
tickets;
(C) displays at those locations the ticket broker's registration;
(D) maintains at those locations a listing of the names and addresses of all persons
employed by the ticket broker;
(E) is in compliance with all applicable federal, State, and local laws relating to its
ticket selling activities, and that neither the ticket broker nor any of its em-
ployees within the preceding 12 months have been convicted of a violation of
this Act; and
(F) that the ticket broker meets the following requirements:
(i) maintains a statewide toll free number for consumer complaints and
inquiries;
(ii) has adopted a code that advocates consumer protection that includes, at a
minimum:
(a-i) consumer protection guidelines;
(b-i) a standard refund policy; and
(c-i) standards of professional conduct;
(iii) has adopted a procedure for the binding resolution of consumer com-
plaints by an independent, disinterested third party; and
(iv) has established and maintains a consumer protection rebate fund in an
amount in excess of $100,000, at least 50% of which must be cash available
for immediate disbursement for satisfaction of valid consumer complaints.
Alternatively, the ticket broker may fulfill the requirements of subparagraph
(F) of this subsection (b) if the ticket broker certifies that he or she belongs to
a professional association organized under the laws of this State...
(2) (Blank)
(3) The ticket broker and his employees must not engage in the practice of selling, or
attempting to sell, tickets for any event while sitting or standing near the facility at
which the event is to be held or is being held.
(4) The ticket broker must comply with all requirements of the Retailers' Occupation
Tax Act [35 ILCS 120/1 et seq.] and all other applicable federal, State and local
laws in connection with his ticket selling activities.
(5) Beginning January 1, 1996, no ticket broker shall advertise for resale any tickets
within this State unless the advertisement contains the name of the ticket broker
730 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Additional requirements of ticket brokers were enacted in 1995. 53 As
a result, ticket scalping has become and will continue to be an inher-
ent part of the sports and entertainment industries in Illinois.
b. Piercing the Corporate Veil
When operating a business, use of the corporate form presump-
tively shields the personal assets of the owners from the claims of bus-
iness creditors.54 Accordingly, use of the corporate form provides
owners the advantage of securing limited liability. Limited liability is
the general rule, not the exception.55 Therefore, the purpose of the
corporate structure will be protected when the corporation functions
as an entity in the normal manner permitted by law.56 Exceptional
circumstances must be present to appropriately disregard the corpo-
rate form. However, the conduct that courts perceive to trigger the
doctrine is far from concrete. 57 The party who wishes the court to
pierce the corporate veil bears the burden of proving that there are
substantial reasons to do so. 58
Commonly, a court may be asked to ignore the liability shield when
the corporation is unable to pay its debts.59 The creditor would like
the court to disregard or "pierce" the statutory limited liability shield
so that the debts can be satisfied out of the owners or shareholders
assets.60 Absent a judicial decision to pierce the corporate veil, the
limited liability created by the applicable statute stays intact and the
creditor shoulders the loss. 61
Additionally, the separate corporate identity of one corporation
may be disregarded and treated as the alter ego of another corpora-
tion under certain circumstances. Thus, a subsidiary corporation may
be deemed the alter ego of its corporate parent. 62 Ordinarily, when
and the Illinois registration number issued by the Office of the Secretary of State
under this Seciton.
(6) Each ticket broker registered under this Act shall pay an annual registration fee of
$100.
53. Ill. Public Act 89-0406.
54. John H. Matheson and Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of
Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners' Lim-
ited-Liability Protection, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 147 (2000).
55. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 270 (D. Del. 1989).
56. Zaist v. Olsen, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967).
57. Chicago-Crawford Currency Exchange v. Thillens, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 295, 298 (I11. App. Ct.
1964).
58. Mobile Oil. 718 F. Supp. at 270.
59. Supra note 54 at 149.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Mobile Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 270.
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multiple corporations are involved, parties seek to pierce the corpo-
rate veil to hold a parent liable for its subsidiary's acts, or the subsidi-
ary responsible for the acts of its parent. However, the equitable
doctrine is not limited to the parent-subsidiary relationship.63 The
separate corporateness of affiliated corporations owned by the same
parent may be equally disregarded. 64
The factors courts consider when resolving whether a corporation
should be treated as an alter ego, mere instrumentality, or agent of
another corporation are numerous. However, the reasoning of the
cases discussing whether a parent corporation will be held liable for
the obligations of its subsidiary has not always been uniform or
clear.65 "The legal test for determining when a corporate form should
be ignored in equity cannot be reduced to a single formula that is
neither over - nor under - inclusive. '66 The terminology used by the
courts has not been a model of clarity either.67 Courts and parties
often use the expression interchangeably, such as the "alter ego the-
ory" and "disregarding the corporate entity" and "piercing the corpo-
rate veil."' 68 Nevertheless, the factors courts consider are the same
and will be analyzed.
The Seventh Circuit declared "[iun Illinois, a corporation's "veil" of
limited liability may be pierced only if two requirements are met: first,
there must be [a] unity of interest ....; and second, circumstances
must be such that adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate
existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." 69 As noted
earlier, the tests that courts use to determine whether such circum-
stances exist are imprecise.
A Delaware court considered the central factual issue to be that of
control. 70 In order to determine whether or not a sufficient degree of
control exists to regard the parent corporation as dominating the ac-
tivities of the subsidiary, the court examined a wide variety of fac-
tors.71 The court considered factors such as stock ownership, common
officers and directors, financing such as commingling funds, responsi-
bility for day-to-day operations, arrangements for payment of salaries
63. Cent. Nat'l Bank of Mattoon v. Bowen Tranpts, 551 F.2d 171, 179 (7th Cir. 1977).
64. Id.
65. Japan Petroleum v. Ashland Oil, 456 F. Supp. 831, 839 (D. Del. 1978).
66. David v. Mast, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, *6-7 (Del. Ch. 1999).
67. Mobil Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 266.
68. Id.
69. Hystro Products, Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1994).
70. 456 F. Supp. at 841.
71. Id.
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and expenses, and origin of subsidiary's business assets. 72 While no
single factor is necessary, a combination of these factors may indicate
to a court that a subsidiary is so dominated that it is a mere instrumen-
tality of the parent.73
Courts have previously articulated the requisite degree of control as
"exclusive a domination and control... to the point that [the General
Partner] no longer has legal or independent significance of [its]
own."' 74 Furthermore, "[a]ctual domination, rather than the opportu-
nity to exercise control, must be shown. ' 75 This element has been in-
terpreted as "such domination of finances, policies and practices that
the controlled corporation has.. .no separate mind, will or existence of
its own and is but a business conduit for its principle [.]"76
Nevertheless, in Japan Petroleum, the Delaware District Court con-
cluded that the overall picture presented by the facts was not one of
complete domination or control of the subsidiary corporation by the
parent.77 In Japan Petroleum, the parent corporation was active in
getting the subsidiary's operations underway in the first several years
of its existence. 78 The parent provided the initial financing for the
subsidiary. 79 A cash management program was used whereby the par-
ent paid the subsidiary's invoices and debited from the subsidiary's
account.80 However, the court said that financial arrangements en-
tered into by a parent and subsidiary for expense and convenience did
not establish an alter ego relationship. 81 The court recognized that the
current trend of companies is the establishment of numerous subsidi-
aries.82 "Common sense suggests that such parent corporations
should be able to establish certain common management programs
which promote administrative convenience without destroying the im-
munity of the parent from liability for the obligations of its [ ] subsidi-
aries, at least when these subsidiaries function as operating entities. '8 3
The relationship in Japan Petroleum had other indicia of control,
but the court held that the parent did not completely dominate the
subsidiary. The parent recruited general managers for the subsidiary
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Del. Ch. 1999)
75. Bowen Trasnpt., 551 F.2d at 179.
76. Zaist, 227 A.2d at 557.
77. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. at 845.
78. Id. at 842.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 844.
81. Id. at 846.
82. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. at 846.
83. Id.
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and two of these managers were relocated from other affiliates of the
parent.84 Furthermore, most of the officers and directors of the sub-
sidiary were affiliated with the parent.85 The subsidiary's officers did
not receive any separately identified compensation above what they
received in connection with their positions with the parent.8 6 The par-
ent guaranteed major bank loans that were extended to the subsidi-
ary.8 7 However, the subsidiary was in no way a shell corporation; it
operated with extensive obligations and rights of its own.8 8 The sub-
sidiary maintained its own bank accounts, prepared its own balance
sheets and employed its own independent auditors.89 Furthermore, all
of the employees' salaries of the subsidiary were debited from the sub-
sidiary's account. 90 Additionally, the subsidiary's dependence on the
parent had diminished since its operations were underway.91 The
court stated that the exercise of temporary control by incorporators
over an incipient corporation does not prevent the corporation form
existing as an independent entity thereafter.92 Therefore, while the
parent and subsidiary did conduct joint operations in many respects,
the Court noted that the subsidiary possessed sufficient indicia of a
separate corporate existence; it could not be viewed as a mere instru-
mentality of the parent.93 As a result, the Court held that the facts did
not warrant disregarding the corporate separateness of the parent and
subsidiary.
An Illinois district court believed the alter ego theory was premised
on an alternative philosophy not contemplated in Japan Petroleum. In
Trans Union v. Credit Research Inc., the court believed that the alter
ego theory is premised on the idea that the corporation in question is
essentially a sham; the corporation must be controlled exclusively for
the benefit of another, such as its parent company.94 The determina-
tive factors the court considered included whether the corporation
was adequately capitalized for the corporate undertaking, the sol-
vency of the corporation, whether corporate formalities were ob-
served, and whether the corporation simply functioned as a faqade for
84. Id. at 843.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 843.
87. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. at 844.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 846.
92. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. at 845-46.
93. Id. at 845.
94. 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7559 (N.D. I11. June 4, 2001).
2004]
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the parent. 95 As in Japan Petroleum, the court noted that while no
single factor is essential, a combination is required. Furthermore, the
court required an overall element of injustice or unfairness to be pre-
sent as well.96
Therefore, courts will disregard the fiction of the corporate entity in
the interest of justice. 97 However, any court that disregards the corpo-
rate form to prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice must avoid making
"the entire theory of the corporate entity useless."98 The "promote
injustice" test requires something less than an affirmative showing of
fraud, but something more than the mere prospect of an unsatisfied
judgment. 99 Thus, an element of unfairness, akin to fraud or decep-
tion or the existence of a compelling public interest, must be pre-
sent.100 Courts inevitably tend to keep in mind a general standard of
reproach when examining the facts of these cases. 10 1 "[I]f an intercor-
porate affiliation is devised for or being used to accomplish an im-
proper or unlawful purpose, equity has the authority to tear down
technical legal barriers and ... grant appropriate relief. ' 10 2 The ensu-
ing cases apply the "promote injustice" analysis of the alter ego
theory.
In Mobile Oil v. Linear Films, Inc., a Delaware court affirmatively
held that a basis to pierce the corporate veil is only in the interest of
justice. 10 3 However, such matters as fraud, contravention of law or
contract, a public wrong, or other equitable considerations must be
involved.'0 4 A breach of contract or a tort, such as a patent infringe-
ment, may be an injustice, but it is not the type of injustice that is
required when piercing the corporate veil.105 Piercing the corporate
veil is appropriate only when fraud or injustice is found in the use of
the corporate form.10 6 Accordingly, a corporation may be regarded as
the alter ego of another where the second corporation was created
merely to avoid the effects of laws.107 However, an intent to circum-
95. Id.
96. Id. at *26.
97. Bowen Transpts., 551 F.2d at 179.
98. Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3rd Cir. 1967).
99. Hystro Products, 18 F.3d at 1390.
100. Id.
101. David, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, at *7.
102. Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, 1 Fletcher 41.10 at 157 (cum.supp. 1988).
103. Mobile Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 268.
104. Mobile Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 268.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 268-69.
107. Id. at 269.
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vent the law is not controlling.10 8 Courts ask whether the parties did
what they intended to do and whether what they did contravened the
policy of the law. 109 As a result, courts examine the totality of the
facts to determine whether a reasonable inference can be made that
the corporate format was deliberately adopted in order to defeat the
legislative purpose of a law.110
In Chicago-Crawford Currency Exchange, v. Thillens, Inc., plaintiffs
charged the defendants with "unfair competition" and a conspiracy to
evade the licensing provisions of the Community Currency Exchanges
Act ("CCEA"). 111 The sole shareholder, Melvin Thillens ("Thil-
lens"), of the defendant corporation was denied a license to operate
and subsequently formed a sole proprietorship to circumvent the
CCEA.112 Thillens obtained a peddler's license and began to sell nu-
merous items of small value and then cash the checks for a much
higher amount than the items cost.1 13 Consequently, defendants were
found to have violated the CCEA.114 The court concluded that the
conduct of the sole proprietorship was an evasion by subterfuge of the
licensing provisions of the CCEA. 115 The court reasoned that it can-
not allow defendants to indirectly do what is forbidden by the stat-
ute. 116 Despite being a separate corporation, the sole proprietorship
was found to be liable because it was wholly owned by Thillens and
the sole proprietorship conspired with Thillens to evade the law.117
In conclusion, the elements courts deem to warrant piercing affili-
ated corporations limited liability shield are numerous and far from
concrete. However, when examining the case law, a somewhat clearer
picture emerges of what courts consider when a corporation is sus-
pected of being an alter ego of another. Furthermore, each basis a
court considers has numerous elements in and of itself; it cannot be
enunciated with a perfected formula. A court may pierce the corpo-
rate veil where the parent completely dominates the activities of its
subsidiary. Additionally, a court may pierce where a second corpora-
tion was created merely to circumvent the effects of the law and in the
interests of justice. Nevertheless, when considering whether a corpo-
108. Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally, 454 F.2d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1972).
109. Id.
110. Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1965).
111. Thillens, 48 I11. App. 2d at 367.
112. Id. at 368.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 372
115. Id.
116. Thillens, 199 N.E.2d at 299.
117. Id.
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ration is an alter ego of another, an in-depth analysis of the relation-
ship between the businesses is indispensable.
c. Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
In Illinois, consumer fraud is considered an omission or conceal-
ment of a material fact in the course of trade or commerce.' 18 A ma-
terial fact is one where a buyer would have acted differently knowing
the information, or if the fact concerned the type of information upon
which a buyer would be expected to rely when making a decision to
purchase." 9 Section 10(a) of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Decep-
tive Business Practices Act ("CFA") establishes a private right of ac-
tion to any consumer "who suffers actual damages as a result of a
violation of this Act.' 120 The elements of a private cause of action for
a violation of this Act are: (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defen-
dant; (2) defendant's intent that plaintiff rely on the deception; (3)
deception occur in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce;
(4) actual damage to the plaintiff; and (5) the damages are proxi-
mately caused by the deception.' 2'
Illinois courts construe the CFA liberally.122 Accordingly, courts
perceive a clear mandate from the Illinois legislature to utilize the
CFA to the utmost degree in eradicating all forms of deceptive and
unfair business practices and to grant appropriate remedies to de-
frauded consumers. 123 Therefore, violator's good or bad faith is not
material.124 Innocent misrepresentations are actionable as well.125 A
violator only needs to intend for a purchaser to rely on his acts or
omissions.' 26 Therefore, a party is considered to intend the necessary
consequences of his own acts or conduct. 27
118. Chandler v. Am. Gen. Fin., 768 N.E.2d 60, 66 (Il. App. Ct. 2002).
119. Id.
120. 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10(a). The Act specifically provides that:
[U]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices ...with the
intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material
fact.. .in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether
any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2.
121. Zekman v. Direct Am. Marketers, 695 N.E.2d 853, 860 (Il1. 1998). The terms "trade" and
"commerce" include the "distribution of any services or thing of value wherever situated, and
shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State."
122. Warren v. LeMay, 491 N.E.2d 464, 473 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Warren, 491 N.E.2d at 473.
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The liberal construction of the CFA has resulted in the recognition
that "bait and switch" sales tactics are actionable. 128 Bait and switch
advertising is a tactic where the seller attempts to attract customers
through advertising products at low prices that he only intends to sell
in nominal amounts. 129 When prospective buyers respond to the ad-
vertisements, purchasing the bait is discouraged through various
ploys. 130 Thus, "[n]o advertisement containing an offer to sell a prod-
uct should be published when the offer is not a bona fide effort to sell
the advertised product.' 13'
d. Unfair Competition
The determination of whether a certain practice is "unfair" under
the CFA requires a case-by-case determination. 132 A three-prong test
has emerged. 133 The first prong asks "whether the practice, without
necessarily having been considered unlawful, offends public policy as
it has been established by statutes, the common law, or other-
wise.. ,,134 The second prong examines "whether it is immoral, un-
ethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous."'1 35 The third prong considers
whether the unfair practice causes substantial injury to consumers,
competitors or other businessmen. 136
Furthermore, in determining whether a practice is unfair, section 2
of the CFA directs courts to consider "the interpretations of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC") and the federal courts interpretation
of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. ' 137 As to unfair
acts or practices, the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA") does
not afford an act or practice to be declared unlawful for unfairness
128. Chandler, 768 N.E.2d at 69. "Bait and switch" is defined as
"[A]n alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service which the advertiser in
truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch the customers from buy-
ing the advertised merchandise, in order to sell something else, usually at a higher price
or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser. The primary aim of a bait advertise-
ment is to obtain leads as to persons interested in buying merchandise of the type so
advertised."
Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, 379 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
129. Disc Jockey Referral Network v. Ameritech Publ'g, 596 N.E.2d 4, 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht Services, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1378, 1385 (I11. App. Ct.
1991).
133. Id. at 1386.
134. Id. at 1385.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 815 Il1. Comp. Stat. 505/2.
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unless it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers. 138
An act or practice can be declared unlawful if the injury cannot be
reasonably avoided by consumers and the injury outweighs the coun-
tervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. 139 Established
public policies may be considered as well.140 However, public policy
considerations cannot serve as the primary basis for a unfairness
determination. 141
e. The Likelihood of Confusion as to the Source of Sponsorship
and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
The purpose of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act
("UDTPA") is to enjoin trade practices which confuse or deceive the
consumer, or which unjustly injure the honest businessman and pre-
vent him from receiving his just rewards from effective advertising
and consumer satisfaction. 142 While the UDTPA primarily focuses on
acts between competitors, an individual consumer can maintain an ac-
tion as well. 143 In order for a successful consumer action to be raised
under the UDTPA, the consumer must allege facts that indicate he is
likely to be damaged in the future.144 However, consumers are often
unable to allege facts which indicate that the plaintiff is "likely to be
damaged.' 45 Therefore, consumers are often precluded from injunc-
tive relief because the harm has already occurred; the individual failed
to show the likelihood of future damages.1 46 Accordingly, when an
individual plaintiff is unable to bring a cause of action under the
UDTPA in an individual capacity, the individual is barred from bring-
ing an action as a representative of a class as well.147
Furthermore, the plaintiff must allege what one is confused about,
or how the defendant's acts caused the confusion. 48 The plaintiff's
allegations of confusion cannot be conclusory.149 Thus, knowledge
138. 15 U.S.C.S. §45(n).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Popp v. Cash Station, 613 N.E.2d 1150, 1151 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992). The Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act ("UDTPA") provides that: "A person engages in a deceptive trade practice
when, in the course of his business, vocation or occupation, he... (2) causes a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification by an-
other." 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/2.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1157.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1157.
149. Id.
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bars an individual from claiming a likelihood of confusion in the fu-
ture. A plaintiff that is aware of the defendant's alleged nondisclosure
cannot claim future confusion.' 50 Individuals that are aware of any
confusion regarding the source of a product can avoid the problem. 151
As a result, an individual consumer's knowledge regarding the source
of the product, prevents one from being confused. Accordingly,
knowledge will also result in the failure of an individual's claim under
the UDTPA.
III. SUBJECT OPINION
This section will explore how the circuit court arrived at its decision
that the Cubs did not defraud customers or break Illinois scalping laws
by selling tickets to a brokerage service incorporated by the Tribune
Company.152
a. Relevant Facts
The Cubs are a wholly owned corporate subsidiary of the Tribune
Company.153 In 2002, the Tribune Company incorporated Premium to
compete in the profitable business of brokering Cubs baseball tick-
ets.154 Accordingly, Premium resells Cubs tickets in the secondary
market. 55 Premium was subsequently licensed by the Illinois Secre-
tary of State and the City of Chicago to engage in ticket brokering.156
Therefore, Premium lawfully resells tickets to consumers for more
than "face value" or the price printed on the ticket. 57 As a result,
fans, customers and competing ticket brokers alleged that the Cubs
are scalping its own tickets; and Premium is just another box office of
the Cubs.158 The Cubs rebut claiming that the ticket brokerage is an
entirely separate subsidiary of Tribune. 159 An in-depth analysis of the
incorporation of Premium shall be explored in this section.
Historically, the Cubs have opposed all ticket brokering and scalp-
ing of tickets to Cubs games. 160 The Cubs policy has been to revoke
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. James Janega, Cubs' Ticket Business Upheld, Chicago Tribune, November 25, 2003, at 1.
153. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 2.
154. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'l
League Ball Club, Inc., No. 02 CH 18372, 1 (I11. Cir. Ct. 2003).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Sara D. White, For the Record, Crain's Chicago Business, August 18, 2003, at 42.
159. Id.
160. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'l
League Ball Club, Inc., No. 02 CH 18372, 5 (I11. Cir. Ct. 2003).
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season ticket privileges of persons engaged in the business of scalping
tickets. a61 The Cubs have also refused to deal with known ticket bro-
kers in the past. 162 Eventually, the Cubs investigated whether they
could enter the secondary market for Cubs tickets.163 However, the
Cubs were aware that they could not directly sell Cubs tickets at
prices in excess of the printed rate.164 Premium was subsequently es-
tablished as a separate entity, with a separate box office, so it could
sell Cubs tickets above face value.1 65 Premium and the Cubs are both
wholly owned Delaware corporate subsidiaries of the Tribune Com-
pany. 166 The Cubs claim their rationale was to provide consumers a
service and protect fans from purchasing illegitimate tickets.167 Others
claim the Cubs reasoning is a pretext for the Cubs envy of the ticket
brokers profiting off resales of Cubs tickets.168 Angry fans simply call
the plan a dishonest scam. 169
Once Premium was incorporated, the Tribune Company appointed
Cubs personnel as president, vice president, treasurer and general
manager of ticket sales of Premium. 170 However, from its inception,
neither Premium nor the Cubs kept it a secret that they were both
owned by the Tribune Company.171 A press release was issued an-
nouncing Premium's opening and that the Cubs licensed its trade-
marks and service marks to Premium.172 Furthermore, Premium's
offices displayed signs that the Cubs and itself had common ownership
by the Tribune Company.173 Also, Premium's yellow pages advertise-
ment stated that it was endorsed by the Cubs. 174 To dispel possible
confusion further, Premium's employees were instructed to tell cus-
tomers that Premium was not part of the Cubs. 175
A separate subsidiary of the Tribune Company owned several build-
ings adjacent to Wrigley Field. 176 Premium leased space in one of the
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id. at 7.
165. Id.
166. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 8.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. Lester Munson, Scalping Treatment?: The Cubs are Ticking Off Fans by "Brokering"
Tickets for Far Above Face Value, Sports Illustrated, June 23, 2003, at 22.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 21.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 10-11.
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buildings, but it occupied space that was not described in the lease. 177
Premium signed a new lease for the 2003 season that increased the
space rented to that actually occupied while only nominally increasing
the rent. 178
In 2002 and 2003, the Cubs sold high demand tickets to Premium to
resell in the secondary market. 179 These tickets were usually held for
VIPs, media sponsors, elected officials and others. 180 Following the
purchase, Premium controlled all of the resales and prices for the tick-
ets. 81 While Premium and the Cubs use the software to sell their tick-
ets, both maintain separate computer systems which record their own
purchases and sales respectively. 182 However, Premium initially ex-
perienced a delay in opening its doors for business. 183 Due to the de-
lay, Premium sought and received permission from the Cubs to return
unsold tickets. 184 Despite the fact that no express return policy was in
their contract, the Cubs determined that they had an incentive as an
organization to allow the returns due to Premium's startup situa-
tion. 185 The Cubs claimed they preferred to have fans sitting in the
seats and generating concessions revenue rather than have empty
seats.186 Despite the returned tickets, Premium still obtained losses
totaling $15,464 due to unsold tickets in 2002.187
Premium's cash is managed through a concentration account where
all Tribune Company's subsidiaries' cash is managed. 188 Furthermore,
each subsidiary has its own bank account, which it uses to receive
funds.189 The subsidiaries' bank accounts are linked to the cash man-
agement concentration account. 190 All of the funds in the subsidiary's
bank accounts are transferred into the Tribune Company cash man-
agement concentration account and swept to zero every night. 191
However, Premium's account is not swept to zero because it must
maintain $100,000 balance as required by the Ticket Scalping Act. 192
177. Id at 11.
178. Id.
179. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9.
180. Id. at 10.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id. at 11-12.
183. Id. at 14.
184. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 14.
185. Id. at 14-15.
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 15-16.
189. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 26.
190. Id. at 27.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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In addition, the subsidiaries have intercompany accounts that are used
to transfer funds between the Tribune Company and its subsidiaries or
between individual Tribune Company subsidiaries. 193 The entries in
the intercompany accounts recognized Premium's purchase of Cubs
tickets from the Cubs in 2002 and 2003.194 Furthermore, a credit was
made on Premium's intercompany account and debited on the Cubs
intercompany account following the return of tickets by Premium in
2002.195
Consequently, an attempt was made to halt Premium's operations
and reimburse fans who bought tickets from Premium. Peter Cavoto
("Cavoto") was a longtime Cubs fan who purchased tickets from bro-
kers in the past. 196 On June 25, 2002, Cavoto claimed he went to the
Wrigley Field box office to purchase a Cubs ticket.197 However, the
ticket sales record showed thousands of tickets were available at the
box office. 198 Cavoto subsequently sought out a ticket broker to
purchase tickets. 199 The broker was a friend of Cavoto's; Cavoto
stood in line to purchase tickets for the brokers business previously.2 00
Nevertheless, the broker referred Cavoto to Premium, where he pur-
chased tickets for $50.98 and $80.20 Cavoto claimed that he believed
he had been deceived in his purchases because he did not realize that
Premium was directly linked to the Cubs.20 2
Gerald Carr ("Carr") purchased tickets from Premium over the
phone after calling an (800) number that subsequently referred him to
Premium.20 3 Carr did not ask for the price of the tickets over the
phone, but he claimed that he expected to pay face value for a
ticket.20 4 When Carr arrived to Premium's box office to pick up his
tickets, he claimed he was shocked by the price.20 5 However, Carr
admitted he had purchased tickets from scalpers previously and he
was in no way troubled by paying more than face value.20 6 Carr at-
193. Id.
194. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 15.
195. Id.
196. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 24.
197. Id.
198. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4.
199. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 24.
200. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4.
201. Id. at 4-5.
202. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 26.
203. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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tended the game and never complained to the Cubs.207 Nevertheless,
Carr saw a news story about Premium on television and felt
deceived. 208 Cavoto and Carr subsequently filed a class-action suit
under the Illinois Scalping Act, the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.20
9
b. The Decision of the Cook County Circuit Court
The circuit court found that the evidence presented by the plaintiff-
ticket buyers failed to prove that the business relationship between
the Cubs and Premium violated any law, custom or practice.210 In
particular, the court found that the Cubs and Premium did not violate
the Ticket Scalping Act 211, that their business relationship was neither
unfair nor injurious to the public, and that the Cubs did not control or
dominate Premium. 212 Furthermore, the court found that the Cubs
and Premium did not engage in any unfair or deceptive practice. 213
Plaintiffs were not confused as to the sponsorship of Premium's busi-
ness either.214 As a result, the court concluded that if the public is
concerned with the common ownership of an amusement and a li-
censed ticket broker, then it is the legislature that can enact desired
limitations; the court cannot encroach on legislative authority by read-
ing limitations into the law.21 5
1. Ticket Scalping Act
Plaintiffs made two arguments in support of their claim that defend-
ants violated the Ticket Scalping Act. First, Plaintiffs argued that the
transaction between the Cubs and Premium did not constitute a
sale.2 16 Plaintiffs claimed that the Cubs and Premium went to great
lengths to disguise the transactions between themselves as "sales," but
the transactions were actually only a transfer of the Cubs ticket inven-
tory to Premium.217 Accordingly, the tickets transferred to Premium
were not offered for sale to the public first. 218 Thus, all of Premium's
207. Id.
208. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6.
209. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1.
210. James Janega, Cubs' Ticket Business Upheld, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2003, § Metro, at 1.
211. Covoto, No. 02 CH at 23.
212. Id. at 32.
213. Id. at 36.
214. Id. at 38.
215. Id. at 40.
216. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 23.
217. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law at 36.
218. Id.
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sales were not resales of tickets that the Cubs previously sold in the
marketplace; all of Premium's sales were in substance original distri-
bution sales between the Cubs and consumers.219 Accordingly, Pre-
mium violated Section 1.5(b) because it did not "resell" tickets as
required by the Ticket Scalping Act.220 Since the Cubs did not sell
tickets to Premium, but "placed" tickets with Premium, the Cubs used
Premium to sell Cubs tickets above the printed price as prohibited by
the statute.221
The court concluded that the transactions between Premium and
the Cubs were sales.222 To prove a sale occurred, there must be evi-
dence of the transfer of ownership for a price.223 Specifically, a sale
takes place when money is paid at the time of sale and ownership
transfers such that the buyer assumes the benefits and risks of owner-
ship.224 When subsidiary corporations of a common parent are in-
volved, it is customary to use intercompany accounts. 225 Plaintiffs
argued that a sale can only occur if payment is by cash or check and
the transactions in the instant case only occurred on paper.226 The
court concluded that plaintiffs' argument ignored modern cash man-
agement practices and the transfer of ownership was evidenced by the
transfer of ownership entries into the Cubs computer system. 227 Fur-
thermore, the court reasoned that a sale took place because Premium
undertook the risks and benefits of ownership of the tickets.228 This
undertaking was evidenced by the losses Premium incurred on tickets
it did not sell.229 Plaintiffs argued that Premium's return of tickets in
2002 to the Cubs was evidence that no sale took place. 230 In rejecting
this argument, the court reasoned that the Cubs had discretion to al-
low returns under circumstances it determined were special.231 Ac-
cordingly, the court found that the ticket transactions between
Premium and the Cubs constituted sales.232
219. Id.
220. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 23.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 24.
223. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 24, citing Plast v. Metro. Trust Co., 401 N.E. 302, 312 (Ill. 1948).
224. Chickering v. Bastress, 130 N.E. 206, 215-16 (11. 1889).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 25.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 26.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Additionally, the court held that Premium operated on a regular
and ongoing basis.233 Plaintiffs' argued that the seasonal nature of
Premium's business and that Premium only sold Cubs tickets did not
constitute doing business on a regular and ongoing basis.234 However,
section 1.5(b) does not require year round activity or sales of tickets to
multiple events. 235 Ticket reselling was Premium's only business and
work was done during the off season. 236 Thus, the court found that
Premium satisfied all the requirements of section 1.5(b) of the Ticket
Scalping Act and did not violate the Ticket Scalping Act by selling
tickets. 237
Moreover, the court held that the business relationship between
Premium and the Cubs was neither unfair nor injurious to the pub-
lic. 238 Plaintiffs argued that the business relationship was injurious to
the public because the Cubs violated section 1 of the Ticket Scalping
Act which prohibits "placing" tickets with a broker.239 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that there was no evidence that the Cubs had an
arrangement with Premium whereby the Cubs shared in the excess
over face value of tickets Premium resells.240 The revenue Premium
received was deposited into their own bank account which was swept
directly into the Tribune Company's concentration account. 241 The
amount received was subsequently entered on Premium's separate
account. 242
Furthermore, the court held that the Cubs did not circumvent the
Ticket Scalping Act by using Premium to sell the tickets at a higher
price.243 Plaintiffs argued that the court should disregard the corpo-
rate separateness of the Cubs and Premium because the Cubs violated
the Ticket Scalping Act by doing indirectly what they could not do
directly.244 In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that Pre-
mium complied with all the requirements as a licensed ticket broker
and that the Cubs were not working in concert with Premium to vio-
233. Cavoto, No. 02 CI-l at 27.
234. Id. at 26.
235. Id. at 26-7.
236. Id. at 27.
237. Id.
238. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 29.
239. Id. at 27.
240. Id. at 28.
241. Id. at 28-9.
242. Id. at 29.
243. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 31.
244. Id. at 29.
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late the law. 245 Therefore, the court refused to disregard the corpo-
rate separateness of the Cubs and Premium. 246
The court held that the Cubs did not control Premium.2 47 Plaintiffs
argued that the corporate separateness of the Cubs and Premium
should be ignored because of their relationship to one another and the
assistance the Cubs gave to Premium. 248 The court disagreed and held
that the business relationship between the Cubs and Premium was in-
sufficient to demonstrate control.249
2. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
The circuit court concluded that the defendants did not engage in
any unfair or deceptive practice.250 Plaintiffs raised two arguments.
First, plaintiffs' claimed that the defendants' violations of the Ticket
Scalping Act is itself an unfair and deceptive practice because the
Cubs failed to reveal that they were using Premium to sell tickets. 251
Second, plaintiffs argued that the Cubs conduct constituted a bait and
switch advertising scheme. 252
The court dismissed plaintiffs' first argument. The court held that
the Cubs did not use Premium to sell tickets above the printed price
and that Premium was a licensed ticket broker in compliance with the
Ticket Scalping Act.2 53 Therefore, plaintiffs failed to prove the first
element of a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act. There
was no deception concerning the independence of Premium as a ticket
broker and the defendants complied with the Ticket Scalping Act.254
The court also rejected claims that the Cubs used bait and switch
advertising techniques.2 55 The court reasoned that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to conclude that the Cubs artificially limited the supply
of tickets.2 56 Furthermore, Cavoto purchased tickets from Premium
at the direction of another ticket broker; Cavoto did not first go to the
Cubs box office, where there were available tickets.257 Thus, Cavoto
245. Id. at 31.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 31.
249. Id. at 32.
250. Id. at 36.
251. Id. at 32.
252. Id. at 33.
253. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 34.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 34-5.
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was not switched. 258 Furthermore, the court held that there was no
evidence that the Cubs discouraged the purchase of tickets from the
box office while Premium was in business.259 Neither Cavoto nor Carr
were discouraged. Cavoto deliberately purchased tickets from Pre-
mium. 260 After contacting the Cubs hotline to purchase tickets and
learning they were not available, Carr was informed that Premium
may have available tickets.261 In light of Cavoto's knowledge and
Carr's purchase, the court held that the Cubs did not engage in bait
and switch advertising.262
3. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Finally, the court held that plaintiffs failed to prove any alleged re-
mediable violations of the UDTPA.263 The court concluded that
plaintiffs failed to prove a threat of future harm to consumers. 264
Plaintiffs argued that future harm will occur because the public's di-
minished opportunity to purchase Cubs tickets at face value.265 How-
ever, the court was not persuaded that such circumstances existed.266
The court found that Premium's entry into the resale market caused
ticket prices to decrease. 267 Furthermore, the court held that plaintiffs
were not necessarily confused as to the source or sponsorship of Pre-
mium's business. 268 Since plaintiffs failed to prove future confusion,
plaintiffs' UDTPA claim failed.269
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will evaluate the circuit courts decision in Cavoto. Four
main arguments will be articulated. First, the defendants did not vio-
late the Ticket Scalping Act. Second, the courts failure to disregard
the corporate separateness of the Cubs and Premium was based on
flawed reasoning. Third, the Cubs did not engage in bait and switch
advertising. Fourth, plaintiffs were not confused as to Premium's
source or sponsorship and plaintiffs lacked proof of future damages.
258. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 35.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 36.
263. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 39.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 37.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 38.
268. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 38.
269. Id. at 38-9.
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A. Premium Complied With All of the Ticket Scalping Act's
Requirements of Being a Licensed Broker
The circuit court concluded that Premium satisfied all the require-
ments enumerated in the Ticket Scalping Act of a duly licensed ticket
broker. The Ticket Scalping Act permits licensed ticket brokers to
resell tickets above face value if the broker complies with the specified
regulations.270 Plaintiffs' argued that Premium did not "resell" tickets
because the transaction between the Cubs and Premium could not be
considered a "sale". 271 Additionally, plaintiffs argued that Premium
did not engage in the regular and ongoing business of ticket
brokering. 272
Plaintiffs' first argument essentially claims that the Cubs placed the
tickets with Premium because their transaction took place on in-
tercompany accounts managed by the Tribune Company.273 Plaintiffs
claimed that a sale can only occur if payment is by cash or check. 274
However, the facts do not support such a conclusion. Modern cash
management practices include the use of intercompany accounts
among subsidiaries of a common parent.275 Plaintiffs' allegation that
intercompany accounts constitutes "creative accounting" ignores real-
ity.276 This method of accounting limits the wasteful, inefficient and
risky practice of cutting paper checks and constantly mailing them be-
tween entities.277 The cash management program used by the affili-
ated corporations upheld in Japan Petroleum is similar to the
intercompany accounts used by the Cubs and Premium. 278 Accord-
ingly, the transactions between the Cubs and Premium constituted
sales as required by section 1.5(b).
Plaintiffs' second argument was insufficient because the facts
showed that Premium was engaged in regular and ongoing ticket bro-
kering. Ticket reselling is the only business of Premium, and Pre-
mium's president works on the business during baseball's off
season.279 Section 1.5(b) does not contain any substantive require-
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id. at 23.
272. Id. at 27.
273. Id. at 24.
274. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 25.
275. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 29.
276. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 17.
277. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 30.
278. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. at 843-45.
279. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 27.
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ment of year round ticket sales.28° Thus, Premium operated on a reg-
ular and ongoing basis as required by the Ticket Scalping Act.
B. Disregarding the Corporate Separateness of the Cubs
and Premium
The circuit court held that it need not disregard the corporate
seperateness of the Cubs and Premium.281 The court would not disre-
gard the corporate seperatness of the Cubs and Premium based on
two justifications. First, the Cubs do not completely dominate and
control Premium. 282 Second, the sale of tickets by the Cubs to Pre-
mium was not a sham designed to evade the prohibitions of the Scalp-
ing Act.283 However, the court failed to consider whether Premium's
limited liability shield should be pierced in the name of justice.
1. Domination and Control
Plaintiffs alleged three factors that demonstrate control and domi-
nance. First, due to the Cubs control of Premium's board of directors,
the Cubs have the power to control all of Premium's sales of tickets. 284
In May 2003, Premium held an annual shareholders and directors
meeting where Premium appointed a new president that lacked
knowledge of basic financial information regarding business. 285 Ac-
cording to plaintiffs, the change of membership of the board and of-
ficers was an attempt to disguise the Cubs control over Premium.
Therefore, Premium is not acting as an independent reseller, but as an
agent for the Cubs. 286 According to the Chicago Sun Times, "Pre-
mium's new president looked like an idiot testifying. ' 287 He did not
know how much money Premium had in the bank.288 He admitted
that he did not know who approved the moving of money in and out
of Premium's account. 289 Second, plaintiffs claimed the Cubs pro-
vided Premium with extraordinary support. 290 Third, plaintiffs argued
that the Cubs and Premium were effectively intermingling funds.291
280. Id. at 26.
281. Id. at 31.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 29.
284. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 37.
285. Id. at 15-16.
286. Id.
287. Greg Couch, Cubs Just Giving Fans the Business, Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 17, 2003, at
103.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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In doing so, plaintiffs' refer to the Cubs' and Premium's accounting
procedures as "creative accounting". 292 Plaintiffs argued that "[t]he
Cubs and Premium do not need cash like everyone else-they have
intercompany accounts and substantively its all one company. '293
Premium did not tender any cash, use anyone's credit card, or wire
funds to pay for the tickets; Premium merely "paid" for the tickets by
making entries on the intercompany account. 294 Nevertheless, these
are the three factors Plaintiffs claim demonstrate complete control
Plaintiffs argument is merely conclusory and unfounded. It is read-
ily apparent that the Cubs do not maintain exclusive domination and
control over Premium. Despite the testimony of Premium's new pres-
ident being damaging, the Cubs do not control Premium's ticket
sales. 295 Furthermore, the Cubs did not provide Premium with ex-
traordinary support. The Cubs and Premium did not intermingle
funds either. Therefore, the evidence failed to show that the Cubs
controlled and dominated their sister subsidiary.
The legal fiction of a corporate entity is such that it persuades peo-
ple to incorporate its business ventures. 296 The law encourages people
to have multiple business interests.297 When Premium was newly in-
corporated and Cubs personnel were appointed to run Premium, busi-
ness decisions were made by Premium's president acting in Premium's
best interest. Decisions regarding accepting Premium's request to re-
turn unsold 2002 tickets were made by Cubs personnel in the Cubs
best interest. Therefore, these business decisions were not legal is-
sues.298  Accordingly, the court appropriately applied judicial
restraint.
The Cubs merely provided Premium support in order for Premium
to open its doors. The overall picture presented by the Plaintiffs was
not one of complete domination or control by the Cubs over Pre-
mium. 299 Admittedly, the Cubs were active in getting Premium's op-
erations underway in the first year of its existence. However, the
plaintiffs' claims of the Cubs providing extraordinary support are fal-
lacious. The Cubs were less involved in its starting stages and assisted
292. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 17.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 20-21.
295. Greg Couch, Cubs Just Giving Fans the Business, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, at 103.
296. Professor Barry Kellman, Business Organizations Class Lecture at DePaul College of
Law (Sept. 15, 2003).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp at 845.
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Premium for a shorter time than the parent did in Japan Petroleum.300
Additionally, Premium was not a shell corporation because it oper-
ated with extensive obligations and rights of its own.30 1 Premium had
a separate bank account and maintained its own balance sheets. 302
Furthermore, Premium's dependence on the Cubs diminished since its
operations were underway. 303 The exercise of temporary control by
the Cubs over an incipient Premium should not prevent Premium
from existing as an independent entity thereafter.304 Therefore, Pre-
mium could not be viewed as an alter ego of the Cubs because Pre-
mium possessed sufficient indicia of a separate corporate existence. 305
Plaintiffs reference to intermingling of funds is misguided given
modern cash management practices. 306 The use of intercompany ac-
counts by the Cubs and Premium for administrative convenience
should not destroy Premium's limited liability shield.307
2. Circumventing the Ticket Scalping Act
Plaintiffs' argument that the Cubs violated the Ticket Scalping Act
by doing indirectly what it could not do directly is inaccurate and mis-
leading.308 Essentially, plaintiffs' claimed that the Cubs conception,
organization and operation of Premium demonstrated that the Cubs
understood it was prohibited from selling its own tickets above face
value and Premium was the instrumentality by which the Cubs sought
to evade this prohibition.309
The terminology plaintiffs used in arguing for Premium being re-
garded as the alter ego of the Cubs was inaccurate. Plaintiffs' unfortu-
nately characterized the sale of tickets by the Cubs to Premium as a
"sham" designed to evade the prohibitions of the Scalping Act.310
Characterizing Premium as a sham is erroneous. A sham corporation
has a narrow legal definition. Sham corporations have a pejorative
meaning, but its meaning is very specific.311 A sham corporation ex-
ists where two businesses are incorporated with one existing to gener-
300. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 32.
301. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp at 844.
302. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 14.
303. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp at 846.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 845.
306. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 29.
307. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp at 846.
308. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 29.
309. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7.
310. Id. at 51.
311. Professor Barry Kellman, Class Lecture at DePaul College of Law (Sept. 8, 2003).
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ate revenues and the other to incur liabilities. 312 A division exists
between the expenditure side from the collection side of doing busi-
ness.313 The Cubs and Premium, when looked at separately, were le-
gitimate for profit businesses with expenditures and revenues. 314 In
short, Premium was not a sham corporation.
In addition to the imprecise terminology used, the court's analysis
of whether the Cubs circumvented the Ticket Scalping Act by incor-
porating Premium was fleeting. Essentially, the court concluded that
since Premium complied with all the requirements as a licensed ticket
broker under the Ticket Scalping Act, that the court need not disre-
gard the Cubs corporate seperateness from Premium.315 Using Mobil
Oil Corp. as instructive, the court concluded that the alter ego theory
cannot be used to pierce the corporate veil because Premium was not
found to have violated the Ticket Scalping Act. 316 However, the
court's fleeting circumvention analysis would have been improper if
the court pierced the Cubs corporate veil in the interest of justice.
3. Preventing Injustice
The court entirely failed to consider the plaintiffs' argument under
the "promote injustice" test. Essentially, plaintiffs argued that the
court, in the interest of justice, should prevent the Cubs from utilizing
the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud or an injustice upon the
ticket scalpers and consumers.317 Plaintiffs' pointed to Illinois case
law that articulates the desire to prevent the formation of collusive
alliances and the desire to compel the impartial treatment of all ticket
buyers by the licensee. 318
However, the relationship between Premium and the Cubs does not
represent the type of collusive alliance the law fears. The relationship
between the Cubs and Premium is readily distinguishable from the
collusive alliance formed in Cort Theater. The court noted that there
is no arrangement between the Cubs and Premium that involved a
sharing of Premium's profits by reselling the tickets above face
value. 319 Premium was a separate business that undertook the risks
and benefits of ownership of the tickets.320 This was exemplified by
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 30.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 29.
318. Id. at 28.
319. Id. at 28.
320. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 25.
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the losses Premium obtained for the costs of unsold tickets in 2002.321
Furthermore, Premium's revenues go into its own bank account,
which is swept directly into the Tribune Company's concentration ac-
count. 322 The use of intercompany and concentration accounts are
clearly not the sort of collusive alliances the law fears because there is
no secret sharing of the profits.323 Unlike the transaction in Cort The-
ater, the Cubs transact with Premium at arms length.
Additionally, plaintiffs seemed to suggest that the relationship be-
tween the Cubs and Premium was collusive from its inception because
the tickets the Cubs "sold" to Premium were not previously made
available to the average fan.324 While the Cubs only sold Premium a
small percentage of tickets in the past, larger percentages presumably
would follow, resulting in an even greater injustice.
While arguments based on fairness will inevitably enflame the pop-
ular debate, these views are legally insufficient. The record is devoid
of facts demonstrating that the Cubs utilized the corporate form to
perpetrate a fraud or to work an injustice upon ticket scalpers and
consumers.325 Rather, the record discloses the opposite. Premium is
pro-competitive and provides consumers a service while protecting
them from illegitimate tickets. 326 Additionally, the tickets Premium
purchased only represented a small percentage of tickets available and
Premium's tickets were typically not sold to the public. 327 Therefore,
plaintiffs did not carry their burden of demonstrating the existence of
exceptional facts, so as to require piercing Premium's corporate
veil.328 Here, the specific facts do not fall into a general term of re-
proach.329 Actually, the facts reveal otherwise. Reliance upon argu-
ments based on potential injustices to loyal fans are not the type of
exceptional facts that warrant piercing the corporate veil. 330
This conclusion avoids making the entire theory of the corporate
entity useless. 331 The popular debate has focused on how the Cubs
are a symbol of baseball's connection to the hearts and souls of fans
321. Id.
322. Id. at 28.
323. Id. at 29.
324. Id. at 17.
325. Mobil Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 270.
326. Defendants' Proposed Facts and Conclusions of Law at 22-3.
327. Id. at 2.
328. Mobil Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 270.
329. David, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, at *7.
330. Mobil Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 270.
331. Zubik, 384 F.2d at 273.
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and how the Cubs are "sell-outs" 332 and are heartless.333 However,
the Cubs are not legally scalping their own tickets. The legislative in-
tent behind enacting the Ticket Scalping Act was to prevent ticket
scalpers from purchasing large blocks of tickets for the best seats at
sporting events and resell those tickets at exorbitant prices. 334 The
conduct complained of was not a conspiracy between the Cubs and
Premium to evade the Ticket Scalping Act.335 Furthermore, Premium
did not violate any statutory requirements of being a licensed ticket
broker.336 The legislature no longer perceives the selling of tickets
above the price printed thereof to be contemptuous; a seller merely
needs a license. Thus, disregarding the corporate separateness be-
tween the Cubs and Premium would not enforce legislative intent.337
Holding that the popular debate warranted piercing would render the
fraud or injustice element meaningless because any conclusory claim
of injustice would satisfy the test.338 Furthermore, the mere potential
to sell large blocks of tickets is not the type of injustice contemplated
by the doctrine.339
Accordingly, this was not an appropriate case to pierce the corpo-
rate veil. 340 Should the legislature feel that it is injurious to the public
for a subsidiary corporation to sell tickets to a licensed broker that is
owned by a common parent, the legislature can regulate it rather then
the judiciary. 341
B. The Cubs Did Not Engage in Bait and Switch Advertising
The circuit court concluded that the Cubs did not violate the
CFA.342 Plaintiffs needed to show that the Cubs failed to reveal that
they were using Premium to sell tickets and that the Cubs used bait
and switch advertising techniques.343 However, plaintiffs failed to
prove either.
332. Mike Dodd, Sold Out? Cubs Hawk Premium Tickets, USA Today, http://usatoday.com/
sports/baseball/nl/cubs/2003-06-19-cubs-premium-tickets-prices-x.htm, June, 19, 2003.
333. Greg Couch, Cubs Just Giving Fans the Business, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, at 103.
334. Waisvisz, 221 II1. App. 3d at
335. Thillens, 48 I11. App. 2d at 370.
336. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 30.
337. Thillens, 48 II. App. 2d at 370.
338. Mobil Oil, 718 F. Supp. at 268.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 29.
342. Id. at 36.
343. Id. at 32-3.
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The Cubs' actions were not deceptive. 344 The Cubs did not deceive
consumers with respect to Premium's independence. 345 Neither Pre-
mium nor the Cubs concealed the fact they were both wholly owned
subsidiaries of the Tribune Company. 346 Immediately upon Pre-
mium's inception, a press release was issued and Premium posted a
conspicuous sign at its box office informing consumers of its relation-
ship with the Cubs and the Tribune Company. 347 While the CFA is
construed liberally, only deceptive and unfair business practices are
actionable. 348 Premium did not intend for consumers to rely on its
acts or omissions.349 It is readily apparent that Premium was ex-
tremely forthcoming regarding its relationship with the Cubs. Pre-
mium intended for consumers to rely on its admissions. Therefore,
Premium did not deceive consumers.
Additionally, the Cubs did not engage in bait and switch sales tech-
niques.350 Plaintiffs needed to show that the Cubs attracted consum-
ers by advertising tickets, which it did not intend to sell in more than
nominal amounts. 351 Plaintiffs contention that the Cubs artificially
limited the supply of tickets by selling high demand tickets to Pre-
mium that were not previously made available to consumers is unper-
suasive.352 Premium's purchases of tickets represented a small
percentage of the tickets that are available to consumers for
purchase.35 3 The tickets Premium purchased came from the Cubs
reserves; if they were available, the tickets were sold to the public just
before games, if at all.354 More than nominal amounts of tickets were
available at the Cubs box office at Wrigley Field for the games. 355
Furthermore, there were numerous tickets available at the Cubs box
office at Wrigley Field for the game that Cavoto attended. 356 Cavoto
deliberately sought to purchase the tickets from ticket brokers, who
subsequently referred Cavoto to Premium. 357 Cavoto was not dis-
couraged from buying tickets from the Wrigley Field box office be-
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 34.
347. Id. at 13.
348. Warren, 142 Il. App. 3d at 566.
349. Id.
350. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 36.
351. Disc Jockey, 230 Il1. App. 3d at 915.
352. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 34.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Cavoto, No. 02 CH. at 35.
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cause he did not request tickets from the Cubs ticket offices in the first
place. 358 Thus, Cavoto was not switched. Carr could not prove he was
switched either. Carr was referred to Premium by the Cubs ticket hot-
line after being informed that no tickets were available. 359 Further-
more, Carr bought tickets in the secondary market previously and was
aware other brokers were an option. 360 The Cubs did not discourage
Carr from purchasing tickets at the Wrigley Field box office in order
to switch him to Premium. 361 The sale of tickets to Premium did not
artificially reduce consumers' opportunities to purchase tickets from
the Cubs box office. 362 As a result, plaintiffs failed to prove that the
Cubs engaged in bait and switch advertising.
C. Confusion as to the Sponsorship of Premium and Likely Future
Damages Were Not Demonstrated
The court found that Cavoto and Carr were not confused as to the
source of Premium's business. 363 Plaintiffs' argued their confusion
stemmed from the Cubs endorsement of Premium, the Cubs allowing
Premium to use the Cubs trademarks, and Premium using a full name
similar to the Cubs Wrigley Field box office. 364 However, plaintiffs'
argument is inherently flawed. Cavoto knew that Premium was a
ticket broker because he previously helped friends in their ticket bro-
kering businesses. 365 Thus, Cavoto's knowledge barred him from
claiming a likelihood of confusion in the future; knowledge of the
Cubs relationship with Premium allows Cavoto to avoid purchasing
from Premium for future games.366 Additionally, Carr's claim of be-
ing shocked at the price of the tickets Premium sold him did not prove
any confusion as the source of Premium's tickets.367 Plaintiffs could
not prove the likelihood of future damage. 368 Due to Cavoto's and
Carr's inability to prove the likelihood of future damages in their indi-
vidual capacity, they were properly barred from bringing an action as
358. Id.
359. Id. at 35-6.
360. Id. at 36.
361. Id.
362. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 34.
363. Id. at 39.
364. Id. at 38.
365. Id. at 35.
366. Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1157.
367. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 35.
368. Id.
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representative of a class.369 Thus, there is no situation in which confu-
sion could arise in the future.370
V. IMPACT
This case will undoubtedly have an impact upon the resale of tickets
to entertainment and sporting events in Illinois. In fact, a Cubs vice
president, who was formerly Premium's president, testified that the
plan was to get involved with other Chicago sports franchises to resell
their tickets as well. 371 Sports economists suggest that team owners
may follow the Cubs lead and merely be angry they did not contem-
plate forming an affiliated corporate ticket brokerage first.372
However, Cavoto does not advocate the eradication of the ticket
scalping industry. Subsequent event promoters that attempt to follow
the Cubs lead must walk an equally fine line when forming subsidiary
brokerage firms. Minor factual changes may result in a contrary out-
come. If the Cubs sold larger percentage of tickets to Premium and it
could be proved that portions were typically available to consumers,
the Cubs would be engaging in bait and switch advertising and Pre-
mium's corporate veil may have been pierced. Thus, event promoters
must be wary when entering the secondary ticket sales market in the
future.
Furthermore, Premium and its imitators are pro-competitive. 373
Tickets for high-demand sporting events have reached outrageous
prices. Cubs' tickets for the most sought after games of 2003 against
the New York Yankees were sold by Premium for as much as $1,500 a
ticket, when the face value was only forty-five dollars.374 Licensed
ticket brokers sold tickets for the same games, but reduced quality
seating, for prices far in excess of $1,500. In order to compete with
Premium, licensed ticket brokers must reduce the price of their resale
tickets.
However, the most significant impact may be upon the Cubs reputa-
tion. Win or lose, the Cubs have always maintained an extremely
loyal fan base. Much of the loyalty the Cubs engender stems from
Wrigley Field. Wrigley Field, also known as "The Friendly Confines,"
369. Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1157.
370. Cavoto, No. 02 CH at 39.
371. Greg Couch, Cubs Just Giving Fans the Business, Chicago Sun-Times, http://
www.suntimes.com/output/couch/cst-spt-gregl7l.html, August 17, 2003.
372. Greg Couch, A Textbook Case of Might vs. Right, Chicago Sun-Times, http://
www.suntimes.com/output/couch/cst-spt-gregOl.html, March 15, 2004.
373. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 22-3.
374. Greg Couch, A Textbook Case of Might vs. Right, Chicago Sun-Times, http://
www.suntimes.com/output/couch/cst-spt-greg0l.html, March 15, 2004.
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is the second-oldest baseball stadium behind Boston's Fenway Park.375
In an era where larger than life baseball stadiums are being con-
structed, Wrigley Field has maintained its traditional appearance.
From the original scoreboard constructed in 1937, to the ivy on the
outfield wall, the Friendly Confines has become a place of homage for
baseball fans.376 While Wrigley Field has also been the site of many
historic moments in baseball, 377 the Cubs have a history of fighting
ticket scalpers as well. 378 The Cubs director of ticket operations once
compared ticket scalping to the black market in World War II. He
said that scalping ". . . depletes the market. [Scalpers] drain the sup-
ply. They force the poor guy from Keokuk, Iowa, to come here and
he can't get tickets and [he] foolishly goes over there [to the ticket
brokers] and pays an exorbitant amount. ' 379 Consequently, fans hold
the Cubs to an extremely high, sometimes unrealistic, standard. Trust-
ing fans allegedly felt deceived once Premium's relationship with the
Cubs became publicized. Ticket scalpers characterized the Cubs
scheme as might versus right.380 However, these arguments intrinsi-
cally recognize that the Cubs are doing something wrong but not tech-
nically illegal. 381 Reliance upon an argument asserting that the Cubs
actions are contrary to the "spirit of baseball" are legally insufficient.
Prior cases against the Cubs whose claims were based on parochial
notions of baseball were held to be legally insufficient as well. 382
Thus, the gestalt of the ticket scalpers' argument against Premium was
inherently flawed.
While loyal Cubs fans will undoubtedly remain devoted to the
Cubs, Premium's future success depends upon its ability to obtain the
good will of its customers. However, Premium has started off on the
375. Wrigley Field History, March 14, 2004, available at http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/NASApp/
mlb/chcfballpark,chc ballpark-history.jsp.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5.
379. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5.
380. Greg Couch, A Textbook Case of Might vs. Right, Chicago Sun-Times, http://
www.suntimes.com/output/couch/cst-spt-greg0l.html, March 15, 2004.
381. Id.
382. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (i11. App. Ct. 1968). The stockholder filed a deriva-
tive suit against directors for negligence and mismanagement. The stockholder claimed that
Wrigley's failure to install lights at Wrigley Field and to schedule night baseball games was inju-
rious to the corporation. The stockholder offered evidence that every other team in the league
installed lights and generated additional revenue from scheduling night games. Accordingly,
Wrigley's decision was made not on monetary grounds, but on Wrigley's parochial notions of
baseball being a daytime sport. In rejecting the stockholders arguments, the court held that the
issue was one properly before the corporation's directions. Furthermore, the court held that the
stockholders claims were conclusory and legally insufficient.
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wrong foot. Consumers presently perceive Premium as a dishonest
scam.383 Premium must reformulate the public's current opinion of its
operation. Premium's continued sale of tickets at prices lower then
other licensed brokers and its insurances of its tickets legitimacy, may
eventually result in such a change. Therefore, should the legislature
fail to act, the market shall decide Premium's fate, not the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, the circuit court was correct in ruling
in favor of Defendants. The Cubs and Premium did not violate the
Illinois Ticket Scalping Act or deceive consumers. Additionally, Pre-
mium was not an extension of the Cubs; it possessed sufficient indicia
of having a separate corporate existence. 38 4 Even though the Cubs
are a cursed franchise on the baseball diamond, the Cubs were victori-
ous in its day in court against ticket scalpers. Should the legislature
feel that it is injurious to the public for a subsidiary corporation to sell
tickets to a licensed broker that is owned by a common parent, the
legislature can take appropriate regulatory measures.38 5 Absent legis-
lative action, the market will decide Premium's future. The judiciary
must not be swayed by the popular debate.
Mathew Siporin
383. Lester Munson, Scalp Treatment?: The Cubs are Ticking Off Fans by "Brokering" Tickets
Far Above Face Value, Sports Illustrated, June 23, 2003, at 22.
384. Japan Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. at 845.
385. Cavoto No. 02 CH at 29.
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